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Abstract—The advancement in cloud networks has enabled
connectivity of both traditional networked elements and new
devices from all walks of life, thereby forming the Internet
of Things (IoT). In an IoT setting, improving and scaling
network components as well as reducing cost is essential to
sustain exponential growth. In this domain, software-defined
networking (SDN) is revolutionizing the network infrastructure
with a new paradigm. SDN splits the control/routing logic from
the data transfer/forwarding. This splitting causes many issues
in SDN, such as vulnerabilities of DDoS attacks. Many solutions
(including blockchain based) have been proposed to overcome
these problems. In this work, we offer a blockchain-based solution
that is provided in redundant SDN (load-balanced) to service
millions of IoT devices. Blockchain is considered as tamper-proof
and impossible to corrupt due to the replication of the ledger and
consensus for verification and addition to the ledger. Therefore, it
is a perfect fit for SDN in IoT Networks. Blockchain technology
provides everyone with a working proof of decentralized trust.
The experimental results show gain and efficiency with respect
to the accuracy, update process, and bandwidth utilization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networking technology has been continuously improving
for the past many decades. This improvement has led to the
emergence of cloud computing with massive computing and
storage capacity in this era of Big Data. The widespread net-
working facilities and high-speed connectivity among devices
form the backbone of the internet of things (IoT). According
to Gartner, Inc.’s recent report, by 2020 the enterprise and
automotive Internet of Things (IoT) devices will expand to
5.8 billion, which is a 21% increase from 2019 [1]. The cloud
networks managing IoT infrastructure will grow in size and
sophistication to cater to the growing computational demands.
To overcome the issue of diverse geographical spread, dis-
tributed IoT network offers promising solutions. However, still
at the core legacy networks, composed of hardware-based,
which are costly, inflexible, and difficult to scale and manage.
An approach Software-defined networking (SDN) is proposed
to cater to different challenges caused by complex and large
network and enables comprehensive network programmability
and improve load management.
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Fig. 1. SDN Architecture
In SDN architecture, the data and control planes are di-
vided into two separate layers, which simplifies network
management. The control plane consists of a controller whose
responsibility includes networking intelligence and policy-
making. Although the division of layers allows the scalability
of the network, however, it also introduces new vulnerabilities.
In a system consisting of multiple SDN networks, problems
like security, performance, reliability, and scalability arise due
to the centralized control architecture. We have identified
certain scenarios in which the SDN architecture becomes
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vulnerable to the attackers. These vulnerabilities allow attack-
ers to execute a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack
on the network [2]. The DDoS attack can be performed by
repeatedly sending unique packets requests to the controller.
Many existing studies highlight security and other issues with
SDN. To address these issues, a distributed architecture (which
contains multiple SDN controllers connected to each other)
is introduced [3], [4]. Several existing studies focus on the
problem of state consistency among numerous controllers.
In the distributed architecture, the flow of data between the
controllers and the forwarding devices is configured statically.
This static configuration can result in an uneven distribution of
loads between the controllers. In addition to these problems, a
distributed SDN network is required, which possess properties
like high availability and low response time. Although there
are multiple studies in the literature offering a reliable and
scalable solution to the distributed network for management
[1], [3], [5], however, none of these studies have solved this
problem completely.
Blockchain (a distributed data storage approach) has re-
cently drawn attention from researchers, which is used to solve
the existing problems of SDN architecture [6], [7]. Using the
blockchain approach, we can manage the applications in a
distributed manner, which was run previously through a trusted
intermediary. All functionalities of the central approach can
be achieved without the need of any central authority. The
blockchain approach offers a distributed peer-to-peer network
in which the untrusted individuals can interact with each other
in a verifiable manner without the need of trusted intermediary
[8], [9]. Permissioned blockchain utilizes access control to
alleviate the burden of proof-of-work by assigning certain roles
to known entities [10].
In this paper, we offer a blockchain-based solution that
is provided in redundant SDN as a load-balancer to service
millions of IoT devices, on an execute-order architecture that
supports high throughput of transactions. The IoT devices will
communicate and get connected to a blockchain-based SDN
network that it utilizes. Our main contributions are following:
1) We define an execute-order architecture for blockchain-
based security for SDN in cloud networks based IoT
setting.
2) We extend permissioned blockchain architecture for
IoT device communications and give a proof-of-concept
implementation of the proposed system.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a summary of the background
and related work related to SDN, Blockchain, and Access Con-
trol in Permissioned Blockchain that we use in our proposed
work. We represent the basic Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) architecture in Figure 1. From top-down, we have
applications that use the two layers of control plane and data
plane for communications. Note that the switches in SDN do
not construct the forwarding table automatically but instead
rely on the controller to construct a flow table [2], [3]. The
control plane of the SDN architecture consists of a centralized
controller, which is the most important new feature provided
by SDN.
The centralized controller help in network management, and
configuration information is stored in a single place instead of
distributing it to individual network devices. Additionally, the
controller has a centralized view of the network, which makes
it capable of calculating optimal routes across the network,
constructing flow tables, and insert them into each of the
switches without relying on distributed routing algorithms.
Lastly, the application layer in SDN allows applications to
request specific network behavior from the controller. As
SDN is taking share and several protocols are being studies,
OpenFlow is emerging as one of the most used protocols in
SDN. OpenFlow [6] is defined as an open standard and as
such not tied to any single controller, making it suitable for
heterogeneous networks. It is a preferred protocol that is being
utilized between the controller and SDN switches. It transmits
messages from the controller to the switch to facilitate the flow
tables constructions/updates. Also, it transmits messages from
the SDN switch back to the controller so that switches can
inform the controller about the various events in the network,
such as new host or switch additions and other similar func-
tions. OpenFlow protocol supports three types of messages:
controller-to-switch, asynchronous, and symmetric messages.
The controller initiates Controller-to-switch messages, while
asynchronous messages are messages sent by the switch with-
out being requested by the controller. These messages include
packets arrival, switch state changes, error states, etc. Lastly,
symmetric messages are the messages sent without solicitation,
in either direction. In this new architecture, every SDN switch
consists of a flow table, which in turn stores a set of flow
entries. Whenever the switch processes a new packet, it is
compared against the flow table to find a matching entry. Once
a matching entry is located, actions specified for that entry are
performed on the packet e.g. forward a packet out a specified
port. If no matching entry is found, the packet is forwarded to
the controller, which can decide the action to be taken on the
packet. Each flow table entry consists of a rule or header field
to match against the incoming packet. Note that every flow
entry is associated with zero or more actions that dictate how
the switch handles matching packets. If no actions are specified
for an entry, then such a packet must be dropped. Flow entry
also contains counters that are maintained per-table, per-flow,
per-port, and per-queue.
In recent years, blockchain is being used in many domains
besides the financial setting. It is a perfect fit for use in SDNs.
Several studies in the literature have designed the Access
control mechanisms using the blockchain approach [11], [12],
[13]. However, these approaches fail in terms of security,
scalability, and efficiency in most cases.
III. BLOCKCHAIN ARCHITECTURE
A blockchain is a secure public ledger to store transactions.
The blockchain does not have a central storage system instead
all the transactions are replicated at the user end (nodes). Each
user has the same copy of the ledger, and each user keeps on
(control/verification nodes)
Miner’s
(request/response nodes)
Members
Fig. 2. Blockchain Network of 21 nodes with 15 Request/Response and 6
Controller/Verifier nodes
updating its copy hence ensuring complete consensus from all
users. At the same time, the blockchain technology provides
everyone with a working proof of decentralized trust. To make
a transaction, it is necessary that the user has an updated
copy of the ledger. The transactions are grouped into blocks,
and after a specific timestamp, a block (consisting of multiple
transactions) is published. Publishing a new block means that
the new block is appended at the end of the chain of blocks.
In addition to this, it is mandatory that before appending a
new block in the chain, all transactions in the last block of
the chain must be verified. The verification of transactions
means to check that all transactions are legitimate. This implies
that appending a new block in the chain also proves that
the transactions done earlier are all legitimate. By doing so,
blockchain is termed to be tamper-proof and impossible to
corrupt. See Figure 2 for a reference blockchain architecture.
IV. PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN
Access control mechanisms are widely using blockchain
based solutions to manage access to sensitive and personal
data [2], [14]. Access control systems manage the access of
sensitive and personal data. Attribute based Access Control
(ABAC) define an access control paradigm by which access
rights are given to the requesting entity (i.e. user) using the
policies which combine attributes together. Transferring access
rights means to sell or grant access rights to other users. In case
of an access request, the requester should have a mechanism to
verify the decision of access request. In this paper, we propose
an approach based on blockchain, which allow the transfer of
access rights among requesting entities and also represent the
right to access a resource. A blockchain is a distributed and
temper resistant database which allows append only operation.
In a Blockchain, blocks are maintained by saving the link
to the previous block where each block contains a set of
non-conflicting transactions. In this paper, the blockchain
technology is used to represent the rights to access resources
and to transfer rights from one user to another. The resource
owner specifies the access rights (policies) on its resources and
each policy is stored as a transaction in the blockchain called
Policy Creation Transaction (PCT). In short, resource owner,
through policies, specifies the user who can have access to
its resources and what set of transactions is required for the
access grant. The owner can modify the conditions specified
in a policy anytime. Using blockchain as proposed, the right
to access a resource can easily be transferred from the owner
to another user. A Right Transfer Transaction (RTT) tracks the
policy whose right are exchanged. In RTT the parties involved
are the current right holder and the object to which the rights
are being transferred to and the intervention of the owner is
not required [15].
The proposed model is deployed on the Bitcoin blockchain
by developing a proof of concept implementation scheme.
Operations associated with policies like creation, pupation etc.
are performed using the Bitcoin transaction. Two commonly
used methods based on the Bitcoin scripting language to
store arbitrary data on the blockchain. To embed data in a
transaction, first a Bitcoin transaction is created using tokens
which is the value used in transactions. A policy is created by
a resource owner through a new Bitcoin transaction having
inputs and outputs. The outputs create tokens to do rights
exchange and to update the policy. The exchange of rights
between two subjects takes place when subjects are interested
in buying or selling the rights. The right exchange is done by a
message change protocol to jointly build and sign the RTT. As
each policy and its updates are publicly visible in blockchain,
the right associated with a policy can be verified by any
subject. The approach mentioned in the paper is validated
through a reference implementation based on the Bitcoin.
Access control has been one of the major challenges in the
Internet of Things domain [16]. With the evolution of IoT
field, an effective mechanism for access control (authentication
and authorization methods) to the private and sensitive data
is of vital importance. This survey paper compares access
control environments in IoT and describes models, prototypes
and protocols in IoT. The paper describes different access
solution in Objectives, models, Architecture and Mechanism
(OM-AM) way. An access solution has three components
authentication, authorization and accountability. The paper
focuses on authentication which is to define a security policy
and to implement a model encapsulating that policy.
V. SDN FLOW RULES TABLES IN BLOCKCHAIN NETWORK
The objective in this context is to make an access control
policy that define rules related to the regulation of access
control. The authorization level of OM-AM model bridges the
gap between high level policies to low level mechanisms of
how authorization rules will be applied. Architecture describes
the participating entities, the work flow and interactions.
Mechanisms define the low-level functions to enforce policies
and how access requests are evaluated against those policies.
In an access control solution, three main constraints that need
to be dealt are flexibility, scalability and heterogeneity. In
addition to this, access control solutions are: a) role-based b)
attribute-based c) capability based and d) organizational based.
The analysis and evaluation of the existing works are also
highlighted. The paper then discusses some open challenges
in the authorization and access control which are i) existing
access control mechanisms vs new mechanism keeping in view
IoT specific requirements ii) centralized vs distributed access
control policies. In the end paper presents some research
trends and gives future directions in IoT. Access control
is a big challenge in IoT devices as it is computationally
infeasible to implement access control mechanism on a device
with limited computational capacity. Managing access control
through a third party may harm user privacy as the private
information can be breached through some security flaw. The
paper devises a blockchain based decentralized privacy pre-
serving authorization framework, FairAccess, to control access
and make authorization decisions. The framework operates
by defining a digital signature called Authorization Token
which controls the access to specific resource. FairAccess
stores the access control polices between the resource and the
requester as transactions in the blockchain. It provides required
authorization functionalities like grant access, revoke access,
request access etc. The paper also discusses the validation of
access control policy and the detection of token reuse.
VI. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section we are presenting a Blockchain based security
and access control mechanism for IoT network.
A. IoT Network model
We are considering an IoT network based on the thin client
model. In this model IoT devices will be without any pro-
cessing capabilities as known as Thin client and will depend
on its server for any processing. As this setup is following
centralized network model that will provide greater flexibility
and programmability. But on the other side this centralization
also come with problems like scalability and single point of
failure etc. Therefore, a physically distributed architecture with
virtually centralized control is required for optimal results.
As there will be different servers, each managing a group of
IoT thin client devices. Further each server will be access by
different users according to the IoT device it controlling and
the type of task (operation) user required. Now the problem
is that all these servers should maintain same state (i.e. same
policy and status of network) without any centralized entity.
Blockchain is the most suitable solution for this purpose. As
it facilitates security and access control for whole network
without centralized entity. In out setting, all the servers will be
part of blockchain where each server will maintain a database
(copy of open ledger). This database will store information
about the access policy and security mechanism. Further, each
change will be considered as a blockchain transaction. To add
a transaction in blockchain, it should be validated by servers.
Let consider Rkij is a request from ith users direct to the
jth IoT device and carrying the kth task. This request must
be from a valid user, must be directed to an IoT device that
access is allowed to this user and should carry a type of task
that is permissible for the user and device both. Additionally,
the network (blockchain) must ensure that no device should
operating within its maximum capacity (i.e. ensuring load
balancing and avoiding target security attacks).
In the following subsections we are presenting security, load
balancing and access control mechanism in detail.
VII. SDN FLOW RULES TABLES IN BLOCKCHAIN
NETWORK
A. Security
There are different types of security attacks that can be
carried on an IoT network. Most importantly, user validity
should be check i.e. if the user is allowed to access any
device in the network. Using the blockchain technology, access
policy details will be available at each server. In case of a
request from a user, the server will check its data base for
user validation and also share this request in the blockchain.
Each server will compare this request with the access policy.
In case the user detail (different techniques are used for
defining access policy e.g. Attribute Based Access Control) are
matching with the access policy. The servers in the blockchain
will verify this request, send verification to the target (local)
server and add this transaction in the blockchain.
B. Load Balancing
This is mechanism to avoid overloading a IoT device by
controlling/migration number of users (requests) per device
in an unit time. Let a user send a request for a specific task
on an IoT device, the permission for this operation should
be conditioned to the current load on that device. To ensure
this each request will be forwarded to the blockchain by the
local server (also checking by itself). Each server will check
the current load on the target device and will calculate the
total load on the device if the current request is allowed. Each
server will send back its decision about the current request to
the local server. In case the request is allowed/verified, it will
be added to the blockchain and also update the device load.
Further, this mechanism avoids and protect the network from
overloading even if the local server act in greedy manner or
compromised in result of an attack.
C. Access Policy Implementation
Considering an industrial IoT network (IIoT), where differ-
ent type of device work together. Each device can perform
different level of operations. Similarly, users in IIoT can be
divided in to different levels and each type of users are
authorized to access/request/change specific task/policy. To
ensure the above access granularity for each device, each task
will be first validated from the blockchain (even from the
authorized users request). This verification through blockchain
will ensure that even a valid user is blocked to perform a task
(operation) that is not allowed to him/her.
Figure 2 depicted an overview of an IoT setup that is
built by utilizing the concept of blockchain SDN, consists of
miners (controller / verification) nodes serving the connected
members (switches / IoT forwarding devices). In the rest of
this work, we will use the controllers and switches as general
terminology. Controllers are mainly responsible for functions
related to flow rule tables such as storing, updating these
tables and processing switches queries. The main function of
switches is to forward the user’s data according to rules defined
in the flow tables. Further, both the members (switches) can
operate in requesting or responding modes. When a switch
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Fig. 3. Flow Diagram of Flow Rules Table Update Process
sends a request e.g. a table update process initiation, this
switch is in the requesting mode while all the other nodes (both
switches and controllers) will be considered in the responding
mode.
The IoT switch enters in request mode when it broadcast a
packet request with a version check to update its flow rules
table. The response to the switch depends on whether the
responding node is a switch or a controller, a detailed process
of response is presented in Figure 3. In the following, we will
explain the response from both switches and controllers. First,
we will consider the case if the receiver of the request packet
is a controller:
• The controller verifies that the requesting flow rule table
(FRT-R) is an update-to-date version or not.
• In case the FRT-R is not an up-to-date copy, the controller
will send the latest copy of FRT to the requesting switch.
• Otherwise, controller will check the integrity of FRT-R.
In case the receiver is a switch then
• First, it checks the version of the requesting switch FRT
i.e. FRT-R by comparing it with its own flow table i.e.
FRT-O
• If both FRT’s have the same version then the responding
switch sends a request to other nodes in the blockchain
to calculate the hash value of the FRT-R.
• If the responding switch received a correct hash value
(proof of work) from the blockchain, responding switch
will confirm FRT-R via a response packet.
• In case the FRT-R and FRT-O have a different version
of FRT then the latest FRT will be determined between
FRT-R and FRT-O.
• If the FRT-R is the latest version compare to FRT-O,
responding switch will update FRT-O.
• Otherwise, the responding switch will send FRT-O to
requesting switch via response packet.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVOLUTION
In this section, we present the implementation detail and ex-
perimental results of our proposed architecture. We performed
extensive experiments to evaluate our approach in terms of
accuracy, scalability, security, and efficiency.
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A CPU based cluster of 15 Intel i7 3.40 GHz with 32
GB RAM servers and SDN based blockchain network with
10 controllers/verifications and 990 request/response nodes.
Figure 2 represents a sample of this experimental setup. In
order to achieve scalability we choose OpenFlow software
switch and OpenVSwitch. Next, we built a normal distributed
SDN to compare the flow rule table update performance
of our proposed Blockchain IoT architecture in large-scale
network. Flow rule tables update time is critical for the smooth
and efficient operation of IoT network. Figure 4 depicts the
comparison results of permissioned Blockchain based SDN
and public Blockchain based SDN. It can be seen from the
experimental results that the performance of our proposed ar-
chitecture (permissioned Blockchain based SDN) continuously
improves as compare to the public blockchain based SDN in
terms of percentage time reduction as the rate of packet-in
arrival increases. Moreover, Figure 5 shows the bandwidth
utilization comparison of different SDN architectures. Figure
5 provides the comparative bandwidth utilization of permis-
sioned, public and OpenFlow SDNs.
The defense effectiveness of our approach is measured using
bandwidth utilization. We compare the bandwidth utilization
of our approach with the OpenFlow network (not utilizing
blockchain). For the software test environment, the MININET
SDN emulation tool is used. The clients were deployed to send
a DoS attack (UDP floating) to the switches, and bandwidth
utilization of clients is measured with and without the DoS
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Fig. 5. Bandwidth Utilization comparison for different SDN Architectures
attack. Figure 5 provides the comparative bandwidth utilization
of permissioned, public and OpenFlow SDNs. In the start
(when there is no attack), the bandwidth starts is 2.1 Gb/s.
As the number of attacks increases, the bandwidth decreased
rapidly. The bandwidth is almost half when the packet arrival
rate reaches 1000 packets per second. As we triple the number
of packets/s, the whole network started coming down and mal-
function. When using the proposed architecture, the bandwidth
starts at 2.1 Gb/s and stays stable even when traffic is tripled
from 1000 packets/s.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an innovative, secure SDN in
IoT network architecture using permissioned blockchains. We
analyze the challenges faced by large scale IoT networks
after the introduction of new communication paradigms. Our
approach addresses those challenges effectively and performs
well under the scenarios where the previous methods failed
to show efficient results. The system improves the networks
performance and capacity in the face of network attacks such
as spoofing and DDoS/DoS attacks. Our approach reduces the
response time of the attack by allowing IoT forwarding devices
to check for any change in the latest flow rules table. We
evaluate our approach (permissioned blockchain based SDN)
in terms of performance overhead, scalability, and bandwidth
utilization efficiency and compare it with Public blockchain
based SDN and OpenFlow SDN models. The experimental
results show that our proposed method outperforms the ex-
isting baseline models. In the future, we will extend our
proposed model to work with distributed cloud computing
architectures in order to evaluate and compare it with other
proposed solutions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research is partially supported by the Research Dean-
ship of Islamic University of Madinah.
REFERENCES
[1] Gartner, “Iot opportunities and challenges in 2019 and be-
yond,” in https://www.gartner.com/en/webinars/26641/iot-opportunities-
and-challenges-in-2019-and-beyond.
[2] S. Faizullah and S. AlMutairi, “Vulnerabilities in sdn due to separation
of data and control planes,” International Journal of Computer Appli-
cations, vol. 975, p. 8887.
[3] D. Kreutz, F. Ramos, P. Verissimo, C. E. Rothenberg, S. Azodolmolky,
and S. Uhlig, “Software-defined networking: A comprehensive survey,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.0440, 2014.
[4] P. K. Sharma, S. Singh, Y.-S. Jeong, and J. H. Park, “Distblocknet: A
distributed blockchains-based secure sdn architecture for iot networks,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 78–85, 2017.
[5] C. Tselios, I. Politis, and S. Kotsopoulos, “Enhancing sdn security for
iot-related deployments through blockchain,” in 2017 IEEE Conference
on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks
(NFV-SDN), 2017, pp. 303–308.
[6] B. A. A. Nunes, M. Mendonca, X.-N. Nguyen, K. Obraczka, and
T. Turletti, “A survey of software-defined networking: Past, present, and
future of programmable networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1617–1634, 2014.
[7] M. Yu, L. Jose, and R. Miao, “Software defined traffic measurement with
opensketch,” in Presented as part of the 10th {USENIX} Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation ({NSDI} 13), 2013, pp.
29–42.
[8] A. Reyna, C. Martı´n, J. Chen, E. Soler, and M. Dı´az, “On blockchain and
its integration with iot. challenges and opportunities,” Future Generation
Computer Systems, vol. 88, pp. 173–190, 2018.
[9] F. Casino, T. K. Dasaklis, and C. Patsakis, “A systematic literature review
of blockchain-based applications: current status, classification and open
issues,” Telematics and Informatics, vol. 36, pp. 55–81, 2019.
[10] M. Banerjee, J. Lee, and K.-K. R. Choo, “A blockchain future for
internet of things security: A position paper,” Digital Communications
and Networks, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 149–160, 2018.
[11] A. Ouaddah, A. Elkalam, and A. Ouahman, Towards a Novel Privacy-
Preserving Access Control Model Based on Blockchain Technology in
IoT, 2017, pp. 523–533.
[12] A. Ouaddah, A. A. E. Kalam, and A. A. Ouahman, “Fairaccess: A new
blockchain-based access control framework for the internet of things,”
Security and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 18, pp. 5943–5964,
2016.
[13] R. Xu, Y. Chen, E. Blasch, and G. Chen, “Blendcac: A blockchain-
enabled decentralized capability-based access control for iots,” in IEEE
International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings), 2018, pp.
1027–1034.
[14] T. M. Ferna´ndez-Carame´s and P. Fraga-Lamas, “A review on the use of
blockchain for the internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 32 979–
33 001, 2018.
[15] M. Samaniego and R. Deters, “Blockchain as a service for iot,” in
2016 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and
IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE
Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data
(SmartData), 2016, pp. 433–436.
[16] U. Jayasinghe, G. M. Lee, A´. MacDermott, and W. S. Rhee, “Trustchain:
A privacy preserving blockchain with edge computing,” Wireless Com-
munications and Mobile Computing, vol. 2019, 2019.
